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REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
FOR AN EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION RULE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Committee Mandate, Composition, and Functionins 
Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird appointed the 
Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication Rule in 
September 1978, charging it with carefully reviewing all 
aspects of California's selective publication system and 
making recommendations to improve its workability. 
The 18 members of the corr~ittee represent a wide 
range of vie~~oints on the wisdom and effectiveness of se-
lective publication. Many have been interested in the op-
eration of the system for some time.!/ This experience and 
diversity of views permitted the committee to conduct its 
deliberations reasonably expeditiously yet thoroughly. 
The committee held two public hearings and solicited 
comments from the public and from l:UJ.uerous groups and indi-
viduals.~/ 'I'he persons who appeared at the hearings or sub-
mitted written views included prosecutors, public defenders, 
other government and private attorneys, bar association rep-
resentatives, judges, appellate scholars, and representatives 
of legal publishing houses and a computerized legal research 
service. 
Selective publication, initiated in California in 
1963, has more recently been adopted by federal and some 
state appellate courts. The committee reviewed prior Cali-
fornia reports and literature, the rules in other jurisdic-
tions, and the legal literaturelf on selective publication. 
1/ 
~./ 
3/ 
A list of the members which summarizes prior involve-
ment in selective publication may be found in Appendix 
E to this report. 
A list of organizations contacted appears in Appendix D. 
This literature reveals selective publication schemes 
have proliferated, they have also become more varied. 
Furthermore, the recent trend of legal scholarship 
seems to be toward increased criticism of these systems. 
A bibliography of recent literature on state and fed-
eral limited publication schemes appears in Appendix C 
to this report. 
Based on the information gathered from hearings, 
letters, scholarly literature, and its own members' experi-
ence, the committee held a series of discussion meetings to 
analyze every facet of the system of selective publication. 
Stnnmary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
following: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
The major topics addressed in this report are the 
Access to Unpublished Opinions 
(Part II, pp. 8-15) 
Citation of Unpublished Opinions 
(Part III, pp. 16-19) 
Publication Standards {Part IV, pp. 20-23) 
Publication Procedures, including Supreme 
Court Decertification, Initial Publication 
Decision, and Requests for Publication 
(Parts V and VI, pp. 24-30) 
Partial Publication {Part VII, pp. 31-33) 
The committee's initial conclusion is that are-
turn to full publication in·official format is impractical 
because of the great volume of court of appeal opinions. 
Modifications in the present system are, however, needed to 
improve its operation and to overcome various practical and 
theoretical shortcomings of selective publication. 
Publication of appellate court opinions serves 
many purposes. It enables courts, lawyers and litigants to 
know the law so that they may make uniform and predictable 
·decisions. lt also informs the public of the law, giving 
fair notice of rights and duties. Publication also exposes 
to public and scholarly scrutiny the philosophical views 
and analytical abilities of the judges. In short, legal 
doctrine can best be understood, interpreted, acted upon, 
criticized, and changed through publication of opinions. 
From this perspective, limiting publication of opin-
ions is subject to numerous theoretical and practical criti-
cisms. The former include the contentions that selective publi-
cation contributes to popular distrust of the courts; creates 
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inequality of access to case law by making pertinent un-
published opinions available largely only to institutional 
and specialized lawyers; limits the Supreme Court's ability 
to correct inconsistent appellate decisions where there is 
no petition for hearing; deprives trial judges, lawyers, 
litigants and members of society of guidance; and decreases 
trial court compliance with the law, thus contributinG to in-
creased appellate litigation. 4/ .. 
California's selective publication scheme is also 
subject to criticism on the practical grounds that the 
criteria for publication are applied unevenly; cases that 
qualify for publication remain unpublished; the citation 
ban does not neutralize the advantges of privileged access, 
since it does not prevent the use of the language and the 
reasoning of unpublished opinions; the procedure for request-
ing publication works unequally since only the parties and 
institutional litigants have practical access to unpublished 
opinions, and they frequently do not have an interest in 
seeking publication; the Supreme Court frequently decerti-
fies published opinions which qualify under the standards. 
Despite these problems, the volume of appellate 
decisions precludes a return to full publication of all 
opinions in the current format of the official reports. It 
is estimated that publication of the entire output of the 
California Courts of Appeal would increase the number of 
volumes of official reports issued each year from about 12 
to more than 60.~ The costs of such a flood of books, in 
terms of purchasing the books themselves, finding library 
space to house them, and taking the time to research and 
read cases, would be prohibitive. Full publication in the 
present official format is simply impractical. 
4/ 
~/ 
Between fiscal 1966-1967 and 1976-1977, the number of 
majority opinions issued annually by the California 
Courts of Appeal increased from 2,444 to 6,003, a rise 
of 146 percent. Judicial Council (1978) Annual Report, 
Table VIII, p. 71. 
Conference Committee Report on 1974 Conference Resolu-
t~on No. 11-18 (1976) 51 State Bar J. 400, 402. 
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This is not, however, the end of the matter. Modi-
ficiations are feasible and desirable to improve California's 
selective publication system and to correct the problems 
outlined above. 
The major improvement for a more practical and 
workable system is provision of full and ready access to the 
entire corpus of unpublished opinions. Allowing interested 
lawyers, judges, scholars, and members of the public to find 
and obtain copies of unpublished opinions will help to make 
the system work more efficiently and fairly. Full access will 
combat the problem of unequal availability of opinions more 
effectively than does the noncitation rule; it will facili-
tate greater and more balanced use of the procedure for re-
questing publication; it will encourage proper observance 
of the standards for publication by the courts of appeal 
in the certification process and by the Supreme Court in 
the decertification process. 
Full access will also help mitigate the harsh 
side effects of selective publication. It should decrease 
public suspicions of improperly motivated suppression; in 
conjunction with proposed citability of unpublished opinions 
on petition for hearing in the Supreme Court, access will 
also permit the Supreme Court to detect and correct incon-
sistencies in unpublished decisions; it will also discour-
age divergent decisions and save effort by making colleagues' 
work available to court of appeal justices; trial court, 
attorney and litigant compliance with appellate law \•Till 
also be increased; and legal advocacy will be improved. 
The remaining committee recommendations also aim 
to improve workability and to mitigate side effects while 
retaining the practical advantages of selective publication. 
The committee recommends that the noncitation rule 
be amended to permit citation of unpublished opinions in 
petitions for hearing in the Supreme Court and citation of 
unpublished opinions of the appellate departments of the 
superior courts in those departments and in the municipal 
4 
and justice courts in the same county. The standards for 
publication should, in the committee's view, be amended to 
include fact cases of first impression, dissenting and rea-
soned concurring opinions, opinions creating or resolving 
legal confiicts, and those that make significant research 
or analytical contributions to the law. The committee recom-
mends that more specific requirements govern the request for 
publication procedure; that the Supreme Court use decertifi-
cation only to enforce the standards for publication; that 
published opinions be retained in the official reports follow-
ing grant of hearing by the Supreme Court; and that the Court 
engage in selective review. Finally, the committee reco~~ends 
testing of proposals for partial publication. 
of the Cowmittee's Recommendations 
Access 
An index to unpublished opinions should be estab-
lised to provide convenient and inexpensive access to them. 
Such index and copies of all unpublished opinions should be 
made available to members of the public, lawyers, judges and 
scholars at convenient locations throughout the state. An 
inquiry should immediately be undertaken to identify and 
evaluate possible methods for providing a convenient and in-
expensive indexing and copy storage and supply system for 
unpublished opinions. 
Noncitation 
A modified noncitation rule should be retained for 
the present; if an inexpensive, convenient access system 
proves feasible, the policy of noncitation should be recon-
sidered. Rule 977 should be amended to permit citation of un-
published court of appeal opinions in connection with peti-
tions for hearing in the Supreme Court, whenever it appears 
that an unpublished opinion conflicts with the case in which 
review is sought; to permit citation of unpublished opin~ons 
of appellate departments of the superior courts in those de-
partments and in the municipal and justice courts within the 
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same county; and to require that copies of unpublished opin-
ions intended for citation be furnished in advance to court 
and all parties. Ethical questions involving noncitation 
should be addressed to the State Bar. 
Publication Standards 
The publication standards in rule 976, subdivision (b), 
should be amended to provide for publication of opinions that ap-
ply established rules of law to factual situations significantly 
different from those in published cases; opinions that resolve or 
create conflicts in the law; opinions in cases involving dissent-
ing opinions or concurring opinions in which reasons are stated; 
opinions th<:tt reversE? administrative agency decisions based 
on a rule of law or interpretation of administrative rules; 
opinions that make a significant contribution to legal liter-
ature by undertakingan historical review of the law or de-
scribing legislative history; and opinions that otherwise aid 
the administration of justice. The presumption against pub-
lication should be removed from rule 976, subdivision (b). 
Supreme Court Procedures 
Rule 976, subdivision (c), should be amended to 
provide that in exercising its power to order opinions pub-
lished or not published, the Supreme Court shall observe the 
standards for publication specified in subdivision (b). The 
Supreme Court should review its forn1er practice of withhold-
ing approval of erroneous portions of court of appeal opin-
ions on denial of hearings. Rule 976, subdivision (d) should 
be amended to delete the language that requires nonpublica-
tion of published court of appeal opinions in cases in which 
the Supreme Court grants review, and the Supreme Court should 
engage in selective review of specific issues in court of ap-
peal opinions. 
Requests for Publication 
Rule 978, subdivision (a), should be amended to 
require the court of appeal to send a copy of its recom-
mendation and statement of reasons regarding a request 
for publication to all parties and to any other person 
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who has requested publication. Rule 978, subdivision (b), 
should be amended to provide that the Supreme Court shall 
dispose of requests for publication promptly and that 
each party to the action and any other person who has re-
quested publication shall be notified of the action taken 
by the Supreme Court. Filing systems should be developed 
in court clerks' offices to insure proper handling of re-
quests for publication. 
Partial Publication 
Proposals for partial publication of op~n~ons 
should be given further study, including developing and 
carrying out pilot projects to test and evaluate them in 
practice. 
DATED: May 15, 1979 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
THOMciS W. CALDECOTT 
SHELDON PORTMAN 
ROBER'r GARDNER* 
BERNAHD S. JEFFERSON 
VAINO H. SPENCER 
Hm·1ER B. THOt-1PSON 
MICHAEL M. BERGER** 
WILLill..M C. CUNNINGHAM 
GLORIA DEHART 
ROBERT FOru~ICHI*** 
JOSEPH FREITAS, JR. 
ELLIS J. HORVITZ*** 
MYRON JACOBSTEIN 
GIDEON KANNER** 
EDWARD L. LASCHER** 
RODERICK H. ROSE 
LEONARD SACKS*** 
CHARLES M. SEVILLA* 
* I concur in all parts of the co~~ittee's report save 
the recommendation that all cases involving a dissent-
ing or reasoned concurring opinion be published. See 
minority report, pp. 35-38. 
** I concur in all parts of the committee's report save the 
interim recommendation to retain a modified citation ban. 
See minority report, pp. 39-43. 
*** I concur in all parts of the committee's report save the 
recommendation that published court of appeal opinions 
not be decertified upon grant of hea~ing by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court. See minority report, pp. 44-48. 
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II. ACCESS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Introduction 
Selective publication of appellate court opinions 
necessarily results in unequal access to unpublished opin-
ions. Rule 977 of the California Rules of Court, which pro-
hibits citation of unpublished opinions, was adopted to 
minimize the advantage of superior access by institutional 
litigators. For this reason, past discussions of access 
have primarily focused on noncitation.~/ However, the issue 
of access involves problems and solutions beyond citation; 
consequently, access will be analyzed independently of 
noncitation. 7/ 
The committee concludes that easing access to un-
published opinions would make the work of appellate courts 
more visible, more understandable and more useful to judges, 
scholars, lawyers, and to the public generally, and would 
also improve the workability of the selective publication 
system. The committee recorr~ends: 
AN INDEX TO ID~PUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD 
BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE CONVENIENT AND IN-
EXPENSIVE ACCESS TO THEM. SUCH INDEX N~D 
COPIES OF ALL UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD 
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ~ffiMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, 
LAWYERS, JUDGES AND SCHOLARS AT COh~NIENT 
LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE STATE. 
Present Practice 
At the present time, more than 85 percent of 
the court of appeal opinions issued each year are unpub-
lished.~/ Within each appellate district, unpublished 
6/· 
7/ 
8/ 
See, e: g., se;ligs~m and Warnlof, ~ Use of Unreported 
Cases ~n Cal~forn1a (1972) 24 Hast~ngs L.J. 37, 52-53. 
Noncitation is discussed in the next section of this 
report (pp. 16-19). 
In fiscal 1977-1978, the courts of appeal filed written 
opinions in 6,093 cases, and 12.9 percent of majority 
opinions were published. Judicial council (1979) An-
nual Report, Tables VIII, p. 54; XV, p. 59. 
8 
opinions are made part of the file record of completed 
cases. When accumulated closed case files exceed the storage 
capacity of the district clerk's office, they are shipped to 
the State Records Center or State Archives in Sacramento for 
permanent storage. In addition, one copy of each unpub-
lished opinion is transmitted to the office of the Reporter 
of Decisions for the Supreme Court in San Francisco. 
copies are stored by district and date of decision. 
These 
While 
the Reporter's office can retrieve specifically identified 
cases on request, it does not have the personnel to perform 
this service for the general public, and it cannot retrieve 
cases according to subject matter or code section numbers. 
In sum, while the 5,000 or more unpublished court 
of appeal opinions issued each year are technically avail-
able for review by anyone interested in doing so, they are 
not indexed or organized in a manner which would make them 
realistically accessible: as a practical matter, they are 
totally unavailable to most attorneys, judges, scholars and 
members of the public. 
Disadvantages of Nonaccess; Advantages of Access 
If unpublished opinions are, by virtue of rule 
977, not generally citable, what difference does it make 
whether or not they are indexed and made conveniently avail-
able? In other words, why should an effort be made to 
change the existing situation? There are numerous reasons 
for providing full access to unpublished cases absent cita-
bility. These relate partly to the benefits such access 
provides to the public and to judges, litigants, and schol-
ars. In addition, full availability is a more effective 
means than the citation ban for equalizing access to unpub-
lished opinions, and it facilitates operation of all aspects 
of the selective publication system. 
Recent years have brought increasing demands that 
the work of the courts be opened to public scrutiny and 
made more understandable to the public, and that the courts 
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be shown to be accountable for their decisions. One recent 
response has been for the courts of appeal to compile and begin 
to publish manuals describing their internal operating proce-
dures and practices. It would be equally desirable to have 
the end product of the courts' work--their written deci-
sions--similarly opened to convenient and ine~pensive 
scrutiny. Mr. Witkin in his testimony before the committee 
expressed the view that such practical access to unpublished 
opinions is part of the program of making appellate court 
operations generally more open and understandable. Full 
access can also help demonstrate to the public that the 
appellate courts are carrying out their responsibility to 
insure that justice is done at both the trial and the appel-
late levels.2/ And development of a practical index system 
should banish the misconception that unpublished decisions 
are intentionally suppressed. 
In general terms, appellate judges need to know 
their colleagues' output so as to avoid wasteful duplication 
of effort and damaging doctrinal conflicts. Trial judges 
must know the status of controlling principles in order 
to apply them accurately.lO/ Counsel engaged in planning 
client conduct, contemplating filing or settling a suit, or 
preparing an appeal have a similar need; scholars must be 
able to spot trends that may be visible only through study-
ing groups of routine cases; and litigants are entitled to 
expect that the courts treat similarly situated persons 
similarly. 
Under the publication standards, an opinion apply-
ing an established principle to a routine fact situation 
9/ 
10/ 
See Do UnEublished Opinions ?amEe~ Justice? (1978) 64 
A.B.A.J. 318 [summary of remarks of Arizona Chief Jus-
tice Cameron at A.B.A. mid-year meeting]; Smith~ A 
Primer of O£inion Writin~ for Four New Judges (19G7) 21 
Ark. B.A.J. 197, 200-201. 
See Rubin, Views from the Lower Court (1976} 23 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 448,~51-4~ ---
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does not qualify for publication, for it is thought to be of 
interest only to the trial judges and parties. The fact is 
that the patterns of such routine applications are of 
general importance to judges, lawyers and scholars. As one 
witness before the committee observed, where a decision 
handed do~m by the Supreme Court is consistently followed by 
the lower courts, it will nevertheless appear to have been 
ignored, for under the present scheme the decisions follow-
ing it will be unpublished. Thus, there will be no way to 
follow its citation history. With the passage of years, no 
one will be able to determine the precise ambit of the lead 
case or whether its principle has, on the one hand, received 
rigorous and consistent application by the lower courts and 
thus is "well settled," or, on the other hand, whether it 
has been consistently circumscribed and limited, or proved 
unworkable in application. 111 Similarly, it will not be 
possible to identify configuration~ of decisions that show 
emerging trends or legal problem areas . .J- 2/ 
Lack of access to unpublished opinions works a 
hardship on appellate attorneys which lessens the quality 
and usefulness of the written and oral argument presented to 
the courts of appeal. It is a cardinal principle of effec~ 
tive appellate advocacy to "know the panel" before which a 
case is presented, that is, to know the views of the member 
11/ 
12/ 
The problem is that, in jurisprudential terms, a single 
appellate decision, whether or not it purports to 1 does 
not establish a broad scale "rule." It stands only for 
the minimum proposition necessary to explain the out-
come of the case. A series of decisions applying a 
proposition is necessary to develop a rule sufficiently 
broad to provide guidance for commonly recurring situ-
ations. See, e.g., Llewellyn (1960) The Bramble Bush 
76-77; Landes and Posner, Legal Precedent: ~ Theoretical 
and Empirical An~lysis (1976) 19 J. Law and Econ. 249, 
249-250; Comment, A Snake in the Pat.h of the Lav1: The 
Seventh Circuit's Non=puEliCatiOn Rule--(1977)~ u.---
Pl.tt. L. Rev. 309, 311-312; Ch~lton, Ai?Pellate Court Re-
form: The Premature Scalpel (1973) 48 State Bar J. 392, 
470-472. 
Note, Selective Publication of Case Law (1966) 39 So. 
Cal.L.Rev. 608, 609-611. 
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judges as expressed in their written opinions. When five-
sixths of these opinions are not available, counsel cannot 
achieve this goal. Appellate counsel should not be placed 
in the position of having to argue a particular application 
or interpretation to a court without being able to discover 
whether that court has decided the precise issue in an un-
published opinion. 
Finally, full access will improve operation of the 
entire selective publication scheme. Private and govern-
mental attorney witnesses before the comn1ittee expressed 
concern, documented with specific examples, that the courts 
of appeal are not correctly or consistently applying the 
standards for publication in rule 976. Some committee mem-
bers and others have found this to be the case in their own 
· 
13 I And · t · · l . · f . exper1ence.-- stat1s 1cs cont1nue to s1ow s1gn1 1cant 
discrepancies in the publication rate between and among 
districts. 14 / Providing convenient access to all unpublished 
opinions would help to solve "this problem. It would facil-
itate operation of this report's proposal (see p. 18) to 
allow citation of conflicting court of appeal opinions on pe-
titions for hearing to the Supreme Court. It would also permit 
periodic audits to evaluate application of the standards for 
publication. 
13/ 
14/ 
See, e.g., Kanner, The Unpublished Opinion: Friend or 
Foe? (1973) 48 State Bar J. 386, 436-442 [identify-
rn:g "publishable" unpublished eminent domain cases]; 
Lascher, Lascher at La~ge (1975) 50 id. 36; Weisgall, 
St0£ 1 ___ -~ize: The Emerging Doctrine of Un-
founded Dec1sion (1974) 9 U.S . .F'.L.Rev. 219, 253-25 
[pub1is'hable unpublished cases in the area of founded 
suspicion]. Cf. Comment, Decertification of AEpel1ate 
9pinions: The Need for Art1c;:~J.a ted Jud1cia_;b_ Re<;tsoning 
and Certain Cal:! .. forn1a r,aw (1977)50 So. 
Ca1.L.Rev. 1181, 1188,-n. 40. ---
See Judicial Council (1979) Annual Report, supra, n. 8, 
Table XV, p. _. 
That publishable decisions are sometimes not published 
is also suggested by the fact that in almost one-third 
(32.3 percent) of the cases involving opinions that 
were granted hearing by the Supreme Court in calendar 
1978, the court of appeal opinion was unpublished. 
Staff analysis, copy on file with the committee. 
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Full access will also do a better job of dealing 
with unequal availability of unpublished opinions than the 
noncitation rule. Despite rule 977, counsel privileged to 
know about relevant unpublished opinions presently has a 
distinct advantage over his adversary, for nothing is to 
prevent him from arguing a favorable case's reasoning or 
even using its very language to the court that decided it. 
At the same time, he can ignore unfavorable opinions. 15/ In 
fact, the impact of unequal access is compounded by the 
publication request procedure (rule 978) , for only one who 
knows about a case is in a position to request publication, 
but he will do so only when it favors his position. Thus, 
providing full access will also facilitate fairer and more 
efficient operation of the publication request system. 
~roaches to Provid~ng Access 
For these reasons, the com~ittee1 as noted, has 
recommended that an indexing and copy storage and supply 
system be developed for access to unpublished opinions and 
that the index and copies be made available in a convenient 
and inexpensive manner in order to minimize the burdens of 
research and retrieva1. 16/ Accordingly, the committee 
recon1mends: 
15/ 
AN INQUIRY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE UNDER-
TAKEN TO IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE POSSIBLE 
~1ETHODS FOR PROVIDING A COl'NENIENT AND INEX-
PENSIVE INDEXING AND COPY STORAGE AND SUPPLY 
SYSTEM FOR UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
Based on public hearing testimony from private and 
government attorneys, the committee is concerned with 
ethical dilemmas posed by selective publication. For 
example, what obligation does an attorney have to in-
form court or adversary of an unpublished opinion the 
attorney knows to be advers~ to his position? The com-
mittee recommends: 
ETHICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING NONCITATION SHOULD 
BE REFERRED TO THE STATE BAR FOR CONSIDERATION. 
16/ In recommending practical access, the committee does 
- not mean to imply that counsel have an obligation to 
research unpublished cases. 
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While it is beyond the scope of the committee's 
charter and resources to recommend an exact format to ac-
complish these goals, it is appropriate to make the follow-
ing suggestions based on matters presented to the committee 
and committee deliberations. There can be great variations 
in the format, quality and cost of indexing systems. It may 
be possible to develop a relatively limited and inexpensive 
index which satisfies the practical needs of bar, bench, 
academy and public. On the other hand, examination of the 
above-noted needs and uses of the access system may reveal 
that a more complex and expensive system is required. 17/ 
Accordingly, the first order of business should be to define 
the specific indexing needs of the participants mentioned 
above. Afterwards, a cost-utility decision can be made as 
to , .. ,hat type or types of index to develop. 18/ 
The committee has received information about 
several topical for unpublished opinions that are 
currently in operation. Two ·handle the unpublished opinions 
of the 1\ppellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
One is maintained by the court staff on three-by-five cardsi 
the other, covering criminal cases, is the work of Su-
perior Court Judge Saeta. Both appear reasonably inexpen-
sive and useful. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit also has an index which it mails periodically 
to interested persons. The committee also notes recent pro-
posals for development of internal indexes in the California 
Courts of Appeal. If adopted, such should simplify 
maintenance of a public index. 
Two legal publishers a computerized legal re-
search service made presentations to the committee and 
17/ 
18/ 
Appellate counsel, for example, may need to be able to 
identi cases by subject matter and identity of panel 
members. Trial judges may need subject matter access 
for all areas they handle. Criminal lawyers may need a 
detailed fact-laden criminal subject matter index. 
In the interests of economy, the committee proposes to 
exclude unpublished decisions previously issued from 
the ambit of the index. 
14 
expressed active interest in tackling the index/access prob-
lem. A preliminary proposal from one of the publishers 
suggests that it might be feasible to offer a commercial in-
dex and opinion service on a relatively inexpensive basis. 
The comrnittee suggests that this avenue be explored further. 191 
Finally, the coromittee notes that modest-priced 
legal research services have recently become prevalent. 
Their advent may decrease the overall costs of researching 
unpublished opinions. 
Conclusion 
The co~mittee recognizes that Californians are 
living in a period of limited funding of government services 
and that this recoi!1mendation will have to contend with 
worthy projects for a share of scarce resources. Neverthe-
less, in the interests of improving the administration of 
justice, the quality of legal practice, the orderly grmvth 
and development of this state's decisional law, and opera-
tion of the selective publication system itself 1 the commit-
tee believes that providing convenient and inexpensive 
access to the body of unpublished dec ions is highly 
desirable. 
19/ More detailed comments on the types of storage/retrieval 
-- technology available for legal materials, and a rough 
cost estimate of their use with unpublished opinions of 
California courts, are found in Appendix B. 
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III. CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Pros and Cons of Noncitation 
Nowhere is the selective publication debate more 
intense than over the associated ban on citation of unpub-
lished opinions. 201 The problem of citation is particularly 
intractable in California, where the courts of appeal de-
cide thousands of cases each year, and opinions must be 
written in all cases. 21/ The recognizes that per-
mitting citation of all unpublished decisions now would give 
institutional litigants an ad van by reason of 
the privi access, and it would impose an impractical 
research burden on s in of general inacces-
sibility of the opinions. 
On the 
that full ci 
hand, the 
improve tr2 
also recognizes 
stration of jus-
tice and the ef s of trial and late advocacy. 
For , in criminal cases and other controversial 
areas, vindication of the unpopular litigant's position in 
the trial court may depend on his counsel's being able to 
find and c an opinion closely in point on the facts as 
vlell as the latvi to do so, he must have access to and the 
right to cite routine unpublished decisions. 
The courts also have an interest in bringing forth 
such opinions, trial courts in order to avoid reversal, 
appellate courts so as to be spared the need to review and 
correct lower court decisions rendered in ignorance of 
binding rul . And society at large v;ould benefit from 
citability in such circumstances, for it would mean less 
20/ 
21/ 
See, e.g., Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg (1976) 
36; Riclliuan and Reynolds, The 
PublicatiOn and 
-··----:. ~~-,-es Court of ~-
---- -----1180. 
Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14. For a summary of the cri-
ticisms that bench, bar and commentators level against 
issuing decisions without opinions, see Richman and 
Reynolds, supr~, at pp. 1174-1176, and authorities cited. 
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litigation and fewer appeals~ and thus lower institu-
tional costs. 231 
Recommendations 
In the committee's view, the benefits and costs 
of noncitation are so closely balanced that no definitive 
policy recommendation is presently appropriate. The spe-
cific exceptions to noncitation proposed below answer some 
objections. Subject to those exceptions, the committee 
recon~ends: 
A MODIFIED NONCITATION RULE SHOULD 
BE RETAINED FOR THE PP~SENT. 
The corr~ittee further believes, however, that the possibility 
of loping an inexpensive and convenient index and copy 
storage and scus above (pp. 8-15} may 
22/ 
23/ 
Cf. Note, 
So.Cal.L. 
Publication of Case Law (1966) 39 
-- ·· ,. written unreported 
value, it is quite likely that 
very simi cases frequently will reappear in the 
court~. Parties will not be aware of prior cases in 
point, and even if the litigants are aware, they will 
feel to fact situations 'Vlhich the courts 
have already_cons • The principle of stare de-
cisis is supposed to preclude the recurrence of similar 
fact situations and encourage parties to refrain from 
unnecessary litigation. In short, although fewer cases 
will be reported, more cases will come to the appellate 
courts." 
The citation ban decreases the amount of appellate la-v;r 
available to guide litigants, attorneys and judges. 
From the per of public administration, there is 
reason to fear that this decrease impairs the appellate 
courts' ability to enforce compliance with the law by 
lower courts and thus contributes to the law explosion. 
Courts may be viewed as a specialized form of hier-
archical organization, in which appellate courts are 
supervisors and trial courts are subordinates. The 
literature of administrative hierarchies stresses the 
difficulty administrative superiors have in enforcing 
their orders among subordinates. Appellate judges are 
in an even more difficult supervisory position. Unlike 
bureaucratic bosses, appellate judges cannot initiate 
corrective action; they must wait for litigants to 
request revie\v. And unlike bureaucratic subordinates, 
lower court judges cannot go to their superiors for 
advice on how to interpret a given ruling. See Comment, 
Courting Reversal: The Supervisorr Role of State 
Supreme Courts (1978f 87 Yale L.J. 1191~1I93-ll95. 
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bear on the desirability of maintaining the citation ban. 
Making unpublished opinions easily accessible may answer 
some complaints about noncitation, but it may also remove 
the objections to full citation. Therefore, the co~~ittee 
recommends: 
IF AN INEXPENSIVE, CO~NENIENT ACCESS 
SYSTElvi PROVES FEASIBLE, THE POLICY OF NON-
CITATION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. 
The committee specifically recommends: 
RULE 977 SHOULD BE 1VI.cENDED24 / TO PERHIT 
CITATION OF ID~PUBLISHED COURT OF APPEAL 
OPINIONS IN CONNECTION WITH PE'l'I'I'IONS FOR 
HEARING IN THE SUPREHE COURT, WHENEVER IT 
APPEARS 'I'HA'l' l!.N tJNPUBLISHED OPINION CON-
FLICTS WITH THE CASE IN REVIEW IS 
SOUGH'r; TO PEPJ1IT CITA'l'ION OF UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE 
SUPERIOR COURTS IN THOSE DEPARTHENTS AND 
IN THE MUNICIP!>.L Al~D JUS'I'ICE COURTS WITHIN 
THE Sl~rvJE COUI\i'J'Y; Al'\JD TO 'l1RAT COPIES 
OF UNPUBLISHED INTENDED FOR 
TION BE ADVANCE TO 'I'HE COURT 
AND AI ... L PAR'I'IES. 
The proposal, to permit litigants to call 
to the Supreme Court's attention, in petitioning for hear-
ing, the existence of unpublished court of appeal opinions 
that conflict with the decision or ruling in which review 
is sought (proposed subdivision (a) {1)), would enable the 
Supreme Court to fulfill its mandate to eliminate inconsist-
ent court rulings, 25/ a responsibility that the Court 
cannot effectively meet now due to the low visibility of 
unpublished decisions. 261 
The second proposed exception to noncitation is 
to permit citation of unpublished opinions of the appellate 
departments of the superior courts in those departments and 
24/ 
25/ 
26/ 
For text of the proposed rule amendments, see Appendix A. 
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29{a). 
See s ci in n. 13, supra, for examples of 
inconsistencies between publishea and unpublished court 
of appeal opinions. 
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in the municipal and justice courts within their territorial 
jurisdiction. This exception the committee considers neces-
sary to remedy an unanticipated adverse effect of the nonci-
tation rule. Most appellate department opinions are unpub-
lished, so the rule wiped out numerous opinions interpreting 
local ordinances and rules and those statutes that are ap-
plied almost exclusively by the lower courts. This is an 
important body of law, since such local authorities and sta-
tutory applications are not ordinarily construed by the 
higher courts. The municipal and justice courts responsible 
for applying statutes locally and enforcing local ordinances 
must, the committee believes, be allowed to use the appel--
late department opinions that interpret them. 
The conuni ttee' s final citation recommendation is 
to require that one who plans to cite an unpublished opinion 
furnish a copy of the opinion to court other parties a 
reasonable in advance of use (proposed subdivision 
(c))i this enables and j to have time to 
analyze the opinion. Where an unpublished opinion is cited 
in a document, a copy of the opinion is to be appended to 
the document. The corr~ittee believes that unpublished opinions 
appended to petitions for hearing in the Supreme Court or to 
answers thereto, under proposed subdivision (b) (1) of rule 977, 
should be excluded from the total number of pages in the peti-
tion or answer. Rule 28, subdivision (b) (4) should be amended 
to so provide. 
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IV. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION 
Introduction 
The committee concludes that full-scale publication 
of the more than 6,000 court of appeal opinions produced each 
year would be prohibitively costly. It therefore favors main-
taining selective publication but with modification of the 
standards for publication in rule 976. 
Witnesses before the corr@ittee documented several 
instances of nonuniform application of the current standards, 
and some committee members have made similar discoveries. 27/ 
Some such inconsistency is inevitable when the standards con-
tain a. signif subj element. The committee there-
fore s that more objective and precise standards are 
required. In a , a of the publication standards 
used the courts281 and in other states291 suggests 
that s of opinions merit publication in 
the sts of sound and effect:ive 
adminis 
recom.mends : 
of justice. The accordingly 
RULE 976 (b) SHOULD BE MiENDED~-Q/ TO PRO-
VIDE POR PUBLICA'l1 ION OF OPINIONS THl\T APPLY 
ESTABLISHED RULES OF LAW TO FACTUl'>.L SITUATIONS 
SIGNIFICl\NTLY DIFFEH.ENT FROM THOSE IN PUBLISH:t;D 
CASES; OPINIONS THAT RESOLVE OR CREATE CONFLICTS 
IN THE Ll~Vli OPINIONS IN CASES INVOLVING DIS~ 
SEN'l'ING OPINIONS OR CONCURRING OPINIONS IN 
WHICH REASONS AH.E S'.rATED i OPINIONS THAT REVERSE 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS BASED ON A RULE 
OF Ll\W OR OF ADMINISTRl'lTIVE RULES; 
OPINIONS THAT Ivl.AKE A SIGNIFICAN'l' CONTRIBUTION TO 
LEGAL LITERATURE BY UNDER'l'I::.KING HIS'l'ROICAL REVIEW 
27/ See references cited in n. 13, supra. 
28/ For a description and analysis of the federal stan-
- dards, see, e.g., Note, Unreported Decisions in the 
t}~~teg._~t~~~SCOurts __ Aepeals (1977)63 CornellL."Rev. 
29/ See Chanin 1 A 
- ~2_~nions ~~ 
(1974) 67 Law 
~ Por text of propo 
Writinq and Publication of 
State App<3llate Courts 
-- -375. 
rule amendments, see Appendix 1' •• 
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OF THE LAW OR DESCRIBING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; AND 
OPINIONS THAT O~HERWISE AID THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE.31/ 
Proposed New Standards 
One new standard provides for publication of opinions 
that apply established legal rules to substantially new factual 
situations (proposed addition to subdivision (b) (1)). The 
rationale for this proposal is perhaps best stated by Mr. 
Witkin, who has noted that legal practitioners are "con-
stantly on the lookout for applications of old doctrines to 
new situations."32/ He further observed that "the difference 
between an old rule applied to a hovel set of facts and a new 
rule devised for such a set of facts is one of degree," and 
that courts have difficulty drawing the line. 33/ 
Like nonaccess generally (see discussion pp. 16-
19), nonpublication of fact cases of first impression de-
prives people of necessary guidance on important issues. In 
addition, appellate advocacy is impaired, for it relies 
largely on argument by analogy, and without publication of 
first impression fact cases, many examples of judicial anal-
ogical reasoning are inaccessible. 
Proposed new subdivision (b) (4) would provide for 
publication of opinions that resolve or create conflicts in 
the law. This standard is largely a reformulation of the 
last sentence of foonote 2 and all of footnote 3 of the 
31/ 
El 
33/ 
. ~· ~ - . 
The proposed amendments to the standards also incorpor-
ate into text the substantive comments now contained in 
footnotes to the rules, to the extent they are not af-
fected by the proposals. Substantive legal rules should 
not, the committee believes, be relegated to footnote 
status. 
Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opinions 30. 
Id. 
Publication of fact cases of first impression is also 
supported by the A.B.A., see American Bar Association 
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration 
(1977) Standards Relating to A?pellate Courts, Standard 
3.37(b) (1); and by the District of Columbia Circuit. 
See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, paragraph e, 
reprinted in Spaniol, Report on the Operation of Cir-
cuit Opinion Publication Plans-for i977, Appendix~ 
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present rule. Resolution of real or apparent legal incon-
sistencies contribute significantly to the administration 
of justice, and creation of such conflicts has equally 
significant implications. The rules of the federal Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits and of New Jersey 
. . '1 . . 34 I conta1n s1m1 ar prov1s1ons.~ 
The committee next recommends publication of all 
opinions in cases involving dissenting opinions or concur-
ring opinions in which reasons are stated (proposed subdi-
vision (b) (5)). This standard has the advantage of objec-
tivity, and since dissenting opinions necessarily disagree 
with the majority's views of the law, they come close to 
qualifying for publication independently, under the existing 
standard mandating publication of opinions that criticize 
existing law (rule 976, subdivision (b) (3)). This criterion 
is also supported by the American Bar Association, 35/ the Ad-
visory Council for Appellate Justice, 361 and as to dissents, 
the State Bar of California. 37/ And because the number of 
unpublished cases involving dissents and concurrences is 
relatively small (about 120 in fiscal 1978) 381 the commit-, 
tee's view is that this standard will not substantially add 
to the volume of published opinions. 
The committee also proposes authorizing publication 
of opinions that reverse administrative agency decisions 
. based on a rule of law or interpretation of administrative 
34/ See Reynolds and Richman, supra, n. 20, at p: 1176 [fed~ 
-- eral court rules]; State of New Jersey (1974) Standards 
for Publication~ Judicial 0Einions, Standard B.7(d). 
-351 
.JY' 
:nl 
38/ 
A.B.A. Commission on Standards of Judicial Admi~istra­
tion, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, supra n. 
33, Standard 3.37 {b). --
National Center for State Courts (1973) Standards for 
Publication of Judicial Opinions: Report of the Advi-
sory counc1l on Appellate Justice, Part II, para. 2. 
Conference Committee Report on 1974 Conference Reso-
lut1on No. 11-18 (1976) 51 State Bar J. 400, 404. 
In fiscal 1978, a total of 151 dissenting opinions and 
148 concurring opinions were filed by the courts of ap-
peal. Of these, 64 cases with dissents, 42 cases with 
concurrences, and 16 cases with opinions concurring 
and dissenting were published. Analysis by members 
of the committee. · 
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rules (proposed subdivision (b) (6). Recognizing the 
growing importance of administrative agency decisions in 
daily life, this standard seeks to insure full compliance 
with authoritative judicial rulings that run counter to 
prior agency policy. 
Opinions that make significant contributions to 
legal literature by engaging in historical reviews of the 
law or describing legislative history (proposed subdivision 
(b) (7)) also merit publication, in the committee's view. 
This criterion recognizes the value to the legal community 
of publicizing thoroughgoing research and analysis in dif-
ficult areas. Researching historical and legislative 
materials is particularly difficult and time-consuming, and 
provision for publication will make its fruits available to 
all. The federal Fourth and Seventh Circuits and the State 
f . . 1 39j o New Jersey have s1m1lar ru es.--
The final additional standard provides for publi-
cation of an opinion that otherwise aids the administration 
of justice (proposed subdivision (b) (8)). This residual 
category will give the system sufficient flexibility to 
permit publication of individual opinions believed to fur-
ther development of the law, to promote justice, or other-
wise to improve the administration of justice. For example, 
the committee believes that opinions invoking generally 
neglected rules of law or statutes aid the administration 
of justice and deserve to be published although they do not 
strictly fit within the parameters of present rule 976. 
39/ See Chanin, supra n. 29, at pp. 376-379~ State of New 
Jersey, Standards for Publication of Judicial O?inions, 
supra n. 34, Standard B.7(a), (b).--
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V. PROCEDURES: SUPREME COURT DECERTIFICATION 
OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Current Practice 
The committee is of the view that the California 
Supreme Court's current use of its power to "decertify"--order 
unpublished--court of appeal opinions is undesirable and 
should be brought to an end. It is understandable that the 
Supreme Court may on occasion differ with a court of appeal 
panel as to the extent to which a particular opinion falls 
within the standards for publication in rule 976(b). Never-
theless, empirical evidence and analysis suggest that in 
fact the Supreme Court decertifies. court of appeal opinions 
that are within the publication criteria, particularly by 
virtue of their novelty (rule 976(b} (1)) or their cricitism 
of existing law (rule 976(b) (3)). 401 Mr. Witkin hit the mark 
squarely when he charged that in reality the Supreme Court's 
practice of decertification has become a "distinct form of 
[substantive] reviev.1." 411 Indeed, Mr. Witkin's criticism 
finds support in statements of the Supreme Court itself, 421 
.!Q/ 
.1Y 
..!_4/ 
See, ~.' Comment, Decertification of Appellate Opin-
ions: The Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and 
certain-precedent 1n Californ1a Law (1977) 50 So.car:-
L.Rev. 1181, 1188-11890 n. 40 [collecting decertified 
opinions appearing to "come within the parameters of 
rule 976 11 ] • 
Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opinions 
§ 22, p. 35 • 
Of particular interest is a letter from the Supreme 
Court addressed to Ms. Mary K. Gillespie, dated May 14, 
1975, regarding Chaffin v. Chaffin [sic] 2 Civ. 43862 
[opn. pub'd. sub. nom. Chaffin v. Frye {1975) 45 Cal. 
App.3d 39], rejecting her request for decertification 
on the following grounds: 
A petition for hearing was filed and 
received by this court. That petition was 
denied. You are now, in effect, asking the 
court to shape the constitutional law by 
suppressing publication of an opinion. It 
appears that to so act would be law by elim-
ination rather than by elucidation. 
A copy of the letter is on file with the committee. 
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while the former Chief Justice has candidly acknowledged this 
use of decertification: 
The • • • opinions ordered to be nonpub-
lished are those in which the correct result 
has been reached by the Court of Appeal but 
the opinion contains language which is an er-
roneous statement of the law and if left on 
the books would not only disturb the pattern 
of the law but would be likely to mislead 
judges, attorneys and other interested offi-
cials. If such an opinion appears •.• , [w]e 
can grant the petition for hearing for the pur-
pose of writing an opinion which would reach 
the same result but which would eliminate the 
erroneous language or rule. . • • The other 
course open to us is to order the opinion to 
be nonpublished and thus eliminate possible 
confusion by members of the bench and bar.43j 
Restoring the Integrity of the Svstem 
The committee is concerned to protect the integ-
rity of rule 976 and to discourage its use as a mechanism 
for substantive review by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, 
it recommends: 
RULE 976, SUBDIVISION (c) SHOULD BE AMENDED44 / 
TO PROVIDE 'l'HAT IN EXERCISING ITS PmvER TO ORDER 
OPINIONS PUBLISHED OR NOT PUBLISHED, THE SUPRE.HE 
COURT SHALL OBSER\r'E THE STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION 
SPECIFIED IN SUBDIVISION (b). 
The committee recognizes that adoption of the 
suggested amendment would exacerbate the Supreme Court's 
workload problem by removing a method for dealing expedi-
tiously with court of appeal opinions that in terms of 
outcome appear correct, and thus do not warrant a plenary 
grant of hearing, yet contain what the Supreme Court con-
siders erroneous or improvident language likely to cause 
problems in future litigation. To handle such cases, the 
co~~ittee recommends: 
43/ 
!Y 
. 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIVE ITS 
Letter from retired Chief Justice Donald Wright to au-
thor of Comment, Decertification of Appellate Opinions, 
supra n. 40 reproduced 1d. at 1189 n. 20,.24. 
For text of the proposed rule amendments, see Appendix A. 
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FORMER PRACTICE OF WITHHOLDING APPROVAL FROM 
ERRONEOUS PORTIONS OF COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS 
ON DENIAL OF HEARINGS.45/ 
This can be accomplished either by the Supreme 
Court's reviving the practice on its own initiative, or by 
adoption of a new subdivision to rule 29~specifying that on 
denial of hearing of a published court of appeal opinion, 
the Supreme Court may expressly withhold its approval or 
otherwise comment on parts of the opinion, and that its com-
ments are to be published in conjunction with the opinion. 
Finally, the coiil!'Tiittee considers "substantive" use 
of decertification to :b::= symptontatic of the Supreme Court's dif-
ficulty in handling its rapidly growing caseload47/ with in-
flexible hearing and review procedures. It believes that 
the preferred long-term solution to this problem would be to 
do away with the current procedure by which the Supreme Court, 
on granting hearing, automatically transfers t.he entire cause to it-
self for a de novo appellate hearing on the entire record and all 
issues, and vacates the court of appeal opinion, treating it 
as though it never existed.~ The Supreme Court's "takeover" 
procedure, should, the committee believes, :b::= brought into line 
with the nationally prevailinq l)ractice""' whereby a court of last 
resort revie\vs the decisions of intermediate appellate 
courts rather than of the trial courts and deals with only 
th . . . . 49/ ose 1ssues requ1r1ng revlew.--ii? For a description and defense of the former practice, 
see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, 
4.6/ 
47 I 
!V 
49/ 
§ 622, p. 4544. 
For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A. 
.. . . 
The growth is dramatized by comparing statistics for 
1965-1966 with 1976-1977. During the 1965-1966 fiscal 
year, the Supreme Court received 1,205 petitions for 
hearing and granted 127. During 1976-1977, these fig-
ures had increased to 2,927 (up 143%) and 231 (up 
82%), respectively. Judicial Council (1978) Annual 
Report, Tab~e IV, p. 64. 
see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971} Appeal, 
§ 617, p. 4540. 
See, e.g., Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, rule 
39, Review of Decisions of Courts of Appeal, specifying 
that Alabama Supreme Court review of intermediate court 
opinions is by writ of certiorari adpressed to specific 
questions or to classes of cases • 
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Such a change would lighten the Supreme Court's 
workload by empowering it to focus on specific issues war-
ranting its attention rather than dealing with entire cases, 
some aspects of which may have been correctly decided by the 
court of appeal. 
Retention of Court of Appeal 0Einions on Grant of Hearing 
To make this system work, the committee further 
recommends: 
50/ RULE 976(d) SHOULD BE AMENDED-- TO REMOVE THE 
Ll~NGUAGE THAT ~mNDATES NONPUBLICATION FOR COURT 
OF APPEAL OPINIONS IN CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME 
COURT GRANTS REVIEW.51/ 
Mechanically, the notation of grant of hearing 
would appear at the end of the court of appeal opinion, 
the way denial of hearing now does. Should the case be 
50/ For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A. 
51/ It is generally believed that the de novo plenary take-
-- over procedure and automatic deletion of court of ap-
peal opinions are constitutionally required under the 
"transfer" language now.in article VI, section 12, which 
provides in pertinent par'c "The Supreme Court may, be-
fore decision becomes final, transfer to itself a cause 
in a Court of Appeal." {See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d 
ed. 1971) Appeal, § 617.) The cases do not entirely 
support this view. One line holds that the order 
granting a hearing empowers the Supreme Court to decide 
all issues. (E.g., Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries, Inc. 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 535, 541, n. 1; Martin v. Howe (1922) 
190 Cal. 187, 188.) Another holds that by reason of the 
grant of hearing, court of appeal opinions "become a 
nullity and are of no force and effect, either as a 
judgment or as an authoritative statement of any prin-
ciple of la'Vl therein discussed." (E.g. , Knouse v. 
Nimocks (1937) 8 Cal.2d 482, 483-484.) The first 
proposition is not necessarily inconsistent with se-
lective grant of hearing, for the Supreme Court may 
choose to exercise less than its full review power; 
nothing requires it to address all issues. Thus, no 
constitutional amendment would appear necessary to 
accomplish selective review. (See Chilton, AEEellate 
Court Reform: The Premature ScalEel (1973) 48 State 
Bar J. 393, 467:T The rule that grant of hearing su-
persedes the court of appeal opinion is more difficult 
to work around, but it is exclusively a rule of inter-
pretation, for nothing in the constitutional text states 
that nullification of the entire court of appeal opin-
ion is a necessary consequence of a.Supreme Court grant 
of hearing. 
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reversed, that would be noted in Shepard's Citations, as 
is the practice in most jurisdictions. 
The committee is mindful that retention of court 
of appeal opinions after transfer to the Supreme Court would 
depart from past practice, as noted in one of the minority 
reports. 
side red 
The mere existence of change, however, is not con-
an unanswerable argument against accomplishing it. 
The committee believes that maximum information 
and exposure is the road to maximum good; every other Anglo-
American jurisdiction with a multitiered appellate structure 
exposes to permanent public view the reports of the entire 
progress of an appeal, rather than pretending that a major 
portion of that process never occurred. Under any circum-
stances, the committee believes there would be benefit for 
both the public and the judiciary in increasing awareness of 
the interaction between our courts of appeal and Supreme 
Court. The court of appeal opinions in question by defini-
tion qualify for publication, and they therefore are espe-
cially carefully drafted and well-reasoned and of interest to 
attorneys and scholars. One cannot help noting that these 
intermediate Of?inions are already published, in the advance 
sheets of the official reports, ru1d in the advance sheets and 
bound volumes of the West Publishing Company's California Re-
porter. To express concern over "subscribers [who] pay for 
many pages of [superseded] decisions1 is unrealistic; at 
present, the only difference is vlhich set of reports a par-
ticular subscriber takes--and preference between commercial 
suppliers does not appear a valid distinction. 
Finally, the present system is uneconomical, for 
it forces the Supreme Court to duplicate the court of ap-
peal's efforts for parts of opinions that are correctly 
decided and adequately expressed. Indeed the Supreme Court 
occasionally refers to co~rect.court of appeal rulings, 
apparently neglecting to recognize that with the current 
system there is no longer any court of appeal opinion to 
52/ 
refer to.----
W See, e.g., People v. Hidalgo (1978) 22 Cal.3d 826, S28; 
"Defendant's attacks upon the revocation proceeding 
were fully considerd by the Court of Appeal and we agree 
they lack merit."] 
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VI. PROCEDURES: INITIAL PUBLICATION DECISION 
REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION 
The committee proposes the following changes in 
the procedure for initial publication of appellate opinions. 
The initial publication decision would still be made by the 
panel that decides the case, but the cownittee recommends: 
RULE 976(b) SHOULD BE AMENDED53/ TO 
REMOVE THE PRESENT PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
PUBLICATION. 
The co~~ittee believesthat as the standards neces-
sarily involve subjective judgments, a more neutral approach 
will produce greater consistency in their application. The 
committee also notes that the ne\V' standard requiring publi-
cation of dissents and reasoned concurrences (proposed rule 
976(b) (5)) is quite objective, so that publication under it 
should be automatic. 
~·he committee believes that fair and efficient op-
eration of the procedure for requesting publication is cur-
rently severely hampered by limited and unequal access54/ and 
would benefit significantly from adoption of the unpublished 
opinion index-access system proposed earlier in this report 
(see p. 8). At present, it is practically impossible for 
most people to obtain copies of opinions, particularly within 
the time limits for requesting publication, and persons with 
access may request publication only of opinions favorable 
to them. Adoption of the coromittee's recommendations re-
garding opinion access will significantly improve the fair-
ness and efficiency of the requesting procedure. 
Witnesses before the committee found fault with 
access and with other aspects of the request procedure. 
53/ For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A. 
54/ That unequal availability of unpublished opinions gives 
-- institutional and habitual litigants an unfair advantage 
under the request procedure has been noted in other jur-
isdictions as well. See, e.g., Reynolds and Richman, 
The Non-Precedential Precedent--Limited Publication and 
N0n-C1tat1on Rules 1n the Un1ted States Courts of Aopeals (1978) 78 Colum.L.Rev.-rf67, 1179. -- • 
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Requests are sometimes not acted upon promptly, and re-
questers sometimes are not informed of their disposition by 
the courts of appeal. The committee therefore recommends: 
RULE 978(a) SHOULD BE AMENDED55/ TO 
REQUIRE THE COURT OF APPEAL TO SEND A COPY 
OF ITS RECOW·ffiNDATION AND STATEMENT OF REASONS 
REGARDING A REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION TO ALL 
PARTIES AND TO ANY OTHER PERSON vlHO HAS RE-
QUESTED PUBLICATION. RULE 976(b) SHOULD BE 
N1ENDED TO PROVIDE THAT THE SUPREME COURT SHALL 
DISPOSE OF REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION PROMPTLY 
AND THAT EACH PARTY TO THE ACTION AND ANY 
OTHER PERSON vlHO HAS REQUESTED PUBLICATION 
SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
Some committee witnesses also complained that re-
quests for publication are not handled systematically by 
court clerks* The committee accordingly further recommends: 
FILING SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN 
COURT CLEP~S' OFFICES TO INSURE PROPER 
HP~JDLING OF REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION. 
55/ For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A. 
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VII. PARTIAL PUBLICATION 
Partial publication is the practice of publishing 
part but not all of an opinion under a selective publication 
scheme; it would be used when only part of an opinion meets 
the criteria for publication, and only that portion would be 
published. Although not authorized by rule 976 or in use in 
any United States courts at present, partial publication 
enjoys support among judges and commentators. Witnesses 
before the con~ittee favored it, some 40 Court of Appeal 
justices at a 1974 workshop sponsored by the Judicial Coun-
cil unanimously approved the idea, the Chief Justice's Spe-
cial Committee on Appellate Practices and Procedures rec-
ommends it, and opinions from nearly every district have 
. '1 b'l' SG/ lamented 1ts unava1 a 1 lty.--
Legal authors5.I/ and the Advisory Council for Ap-
pellate Justice have also recommended partial publication. 58 / 
56/ 
;ul 
.s_e/ 
See Golden Gate Bridge Dist. v. Muzzi {1978) 83 Cal. 
App.3d 707, 714 [First District, Third Division]; 
People v. Collins (1975) 44 Ca1.App.3d 617, 623 [Third 
District]: People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183, 
189 [Fourth District, Second Division]; People v. Su-
perior Court (Hulbert) (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 497, 414-
415 [Fourth District, Second Division]; People v. Muse 
(1978) 5 Crim. 2884 [unpublished decision of Fifth Dis-
trict; author prepared a "fictitious" published opinion 
for the one issue warranting publication; copy on file 
with committee]. See also People v. Moore (1971) 15 
Cal.App.3d 851 [Second District, Division II], an ac-
tua-l opinion that is partially published. For an ex-
ample of a wholly published opinion that, according 
to its author, contains unpublishable material, see 
Meyser v. American Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. {1978) 85 
Cal.App.3d 933; the "unpublishable" part runs from 
p. 938 through p. 941. 
E.g., Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opin-
ions § 23, p. 37; Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Pro-
l?osal for a Change.~ the ~'Packa~in9: 11 of Californi"a--
Court of Appeal Op1n1ons to Prov1de More Useful Infor-
matlon for the Consumer (1979) 19 Santa Clara L.Rev. 53. 
----- . 
Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions, Part ·xi, 
section II, paragraph 4, reprinted in part in Leflar 
(1974) Appellate Judicial Opinions 318. 
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However, the State Bar Conference Committee on Publication 
of Opinions in 1976 voted against the idea. 59 / 
Claimed Advantages and Committee Uncertainties 
Supporters of partial publication contend that it 
is needed to deal properly with opinions that contain both 
publishable and unpublishable material, opinions which must 
now be either published in full--adding needless pages to 
the reports--or not published--depriving bench, bar and 
academy of useful judicial rulings. The committee, however, 
is uncertain as to the overall impact of partial publica-
tion. Its use would seem to require more discriminating 
application of the publication criteria than the present sys-
tem, and this may not be possible given the vagueness and 
subjectivity of the standards. Upon reviewing the above-
cited opinions that separated out "unpublishable" materials, 
some committee members found that the "unpublishable" sec-
tions in fact sometimes met the standards for publication. 
Also, some members, noting that all but one of the above-
cited cases involved criminal law, expressed concern that 
partial publication will further reduce the number of pub-
lished criminal rulings, to the prejudice of defendants. 
A second area of committee uncertainty involves 
the appropriate mechanics of partial publication. Should 
the published part of an opinion summarize omitted material 
or simply indicate deletions? The former system vmuld pre-
serve overall case contents, which may be important in crim-
inal cases, particularly where prejudicial error is at is-
sue; the latter would save space and perhaps time. Should 
citation be permitted to unpublished or summarized portions 
of partially published opinions? Should summarized parts bein-
dexed/digested? How should Shepard's Citations handle partiaLly 
published opinions where, e.g., a case is reversed on an un-
published point? Should it be possible to request publica-
tion of parts of unpublished opinions? If so, how should 
59! Conference Co~nittee Report on 1974 Conference Resolu-
tion No. 11-18 (1976} 51 State Bar J. 400, 404. 
The California Academy of Appellate Lawyers supported 
the Conference Corr~ittee Report. Letter of August 22, 
1976 from Ellis Horvitz to Robert .S~ligson, copy on 
file with committee. 
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deletions or summaries be prepared in such cases, and by 
whom? And should such a rule be made retroactive? 
In any event, selecting and drafting factual and 
legal material so as to make a partially published opinion 
both accurate and intelligible in itself also appears to be 
a delicate problem. 601 Perhaps, absent judicial experience, 
appropriate approaches can be discovered in legal casebooks, 
which routinely must face comparable problems in excerpting 
appellate opinions for use by law students and professors. 
Recommendation 
In sum, the committee is aware that partial pub-
lication enjoys substantial support. The committee is, 
however, concerned at the number and gravity of the unan-
swered questions in the realms of both policy and practical 
implementation. For this reason, the committee recommends: 
60/ 
PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION OF 
OPINIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER STUDY, IN-
CLUDING DEVELOP¥1ENT AND CARRYING OUT OF 
PILOT PROJECTS TO 'l'EST AND EVALUATE THEivi 
IN PRJ'>,CTICE. 
See Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One 
Court's Experience (1978) 32 Ark.L.ReV':" 26, 28 ("The 
Arkansas rule omits a provision of the model rule per-
mitting only a part of an opinion to be published, the 
[Arkansas Supreme] Court's thought being that the oc-
casional usefulness of partial publication would be 
more than offset by the difficulties inherent in any 
attempt to write an opinion intended for dissection"). 
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rUNORITY REPORT 
The present wide disparity in publication rates be-
tween the various divisions of the Courts of Appeal establishes 
rather conclusively that the present standards are not being 
applied uniformly. The desirability of more objective standards 
is manifest. HOivever, the creation of an arbitrary standard 
which has no relevance to the precedential value of the case 
is no ansv;er. Therefore, I must part company \'lith the rest of 
the committee in its recommendation that all cases in which a 
concurring or dissenting opinion with reasons given be pub-
lished. 
vfuile I lean to the school of thought that the major 
vice under present publication practices is overpublication 
rather than underpublication, I have, with some reservations, 
gone along with the reco~~endations of the committee as to most 
of the suggestions for amendments to Rule 976b. Frankly, I 
think most of them are rather more cosmetic than substantive 
and I seriously doubt that they will change present publication 
practices. However, if these changes will make the critics of 
the present situation happy, I have little hesitation in 
joining with the majority as to most of these reco~~endations. 
However, I must part company with the committee in its 
recommendation b-4 that all cases be published in which a 
dissenting or concurring opinion in which reasons are stated be 
published. In an effort to establish objective standards, I 
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submit that the committee has recommended an arbitrary 
standard which has no relationship to the ultimate goal, i.e., 
the publication of appropriate opinions and the nonpublication 
of inappropriate opinions. 
The idea that an opinion with a dissent somehow has 
gained precedential value is simply wrong. The five, free-
thinking, independent-minded justices of my own court dissent 
regularly, vigorously and enthusiastically and often as not 
in cases of absolutely no precedential value. The bare fact 
of a dissent does not elevate the case to the status of a 
publishable opinion. Most dissents arise from a difference 
of opinion as to the exercise of discretion on the part of 
the trial court, whether substantial evidence supports a 
judgment or order, or whether an error is of prejudicial 
proportion. Publication of these opinions will merely clutter 
up the books and will add nothing to the corpus of the law. 
These are judgment calls, pure and simple. 
The idea of publishing all cases in which concurring 
opinions are filed is even worse. A concurring opinion merely 
means that one member of the panel agrees with·the result but 
not with the analysis of the majorityj or one justice may take 
issue with some of the language of the majority, or one justice 
may choose to reach the same result via another analysis. None 
of these have anything to do with the value of the case as 
precedent. 
Additionally, this rule would open the door to an abuse 
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of the system. It will allow the author of the opinion, rather 
than the court, to make the decision re publication by the simple 
expedient of filing a concurring opinion with his own majority 
opinion. This committee very properly rejected the concept 
that the author of the opinion be the sole judge as to pub-
lication. Any reader of the Advance Sheets must be quite aware 
that a very large number of published opinions are authored by 
a rather limited number of justices. Somehow these justices 
seem to find specks of gold in each of their opinions which 
specks of gold the rest of us are too obtuse to discover in 
our own opinions. The only restriction on these over-enthusiastic 
authors is the fact that the decision as to whether to publish 
is a court decision and not that of the individual. Thus, it 
is possible to circumvent this safety valve by the simple ex-
pedient of writing a concurring opinion to go with one's 
1/ 
majority opinion.-
I am not nit-picking. Out of 5,959 majority opinions 
filed in the fiscal year 1977-1978, 297 fell into this cate-
gory, 146 with concurring opinions and 151 with dissenting 
opinions. Since the average vollli~e of Cal.App. 3d contains about 
1/ In this respect, I am indebted to fellow co~~ittee 
member,-Gideon Kanner, for the pr!celess case of Alevizos 
v. Metrooolitan Airport Conmission, etc., 216 lHl 2d 651, 666, 
where the author of the majority opinion dissented in part 
from his own handiwork. 
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200 opinions, we are talking about a volume and a half' of 
opinions. I'll admit that of the above .figures, some 
are already being published but when I see that almost 
300 opinions are going to experience instant publication 
regardless of merit, I am disturbed. 
Therefore, I must respectf'ully dissent from that 
portion of the committee report which recomnends that opinions 
containing dissents or concurrences wit~ reasons stated be 
published. 
Actually, the inability of those of us on the Courts 
of Appeal to police ourselves persuades me that some agency 
or entity other than the court writing the opinion should 
make the decision regarding publication. However, when this 
idea was presented to the comnittee, it failed dismally. 
Nevertheless, if the present abuse of both overpublication 
and underpublication continues, something of this nature looms 
in our .future. 
DATED: May 15, 1979 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT GARDNER 
CHARLES M. SEVILLA 
MINORITY REPORT ON THE NON-CITABILITY RULE 
The undersigned members of the committee endorse 
the affirmative recommendations of the majority report 
and (with the exception to be noted) join in the majority's 
decision to refrain from recommending other action. In 
particular, we are greatly encouraged by the recommendation 
that steps be taken to devise and effectuate practical means 
of access to the body of unpublished decisions of Courts of 
Appeal, including exploration of contemporary technology 
and alternate media for disseminating the contents of such 
decisions. The latter is a realistic and principled step 
toward public accountability for judicial product and res~~ct 
for the time-honored function of stare decisis. 
However, we cannot subscribe to the majority's 
failure to come to grips with the irrationalities, illogic 
and (we believe) constitutional infirmities of continued 
adherence to the ban which Rule 977 imposes on citing certain 
decided cases. We believe that courts make law by what they 
say and do, and not just by the form of expression they choose. 
Consequently, we believe it unsound to act as if certain 
judicial action did not occur, when manifestly it did. 
The Committee heard no defense of a ban on citation 
in terms of either principle or philosophy; even those who 
advocate retention of the practice admit they cannot justify 
it on such grounds. We are told, however, that it must be 
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retained for reasons of sheer expediency from either 
(or both) of two standpoints: (1) the "system" will simply 
"choke itself" if litigants are allowed freedom to tell 
courts what other courts have done; (2) allowing reference 
to previous decisions not contained in the official reports 
will give some lawyers an "unfair advantage" over others. 
We are not persuaded. Vivid characterization is 
simply not an argument, nor do we see the judicial process 
as a game in which handicapping is necessary to insure that 
each player has an equal chance at winning. It is entirely 
possible that denying the existence of immutable fact does 
make life easier for some lawyers, but we doubt that is an 
acceptable rationale. If there is any area of our body 
politic in which expedience should not be exalted over 
principle, we believe it to be the judicial process. 
We cannot condone the anomaly inherent in depriving 
generations of litigants who would be affected, the benefit 
of pertinent prior decisions, and then exhorting the 
goodness inherent in providing access to them. 
Specifically, there are two fundamental problems 
with the majority's endorsement of perpetuation of the 
non-citability rule. 
First, the majority appears oblivious to the fact 
that it simply cuts across the grain of the sense of fairness 
of a principled society that a litigant who is before a 
court and who desires to be treated by that court in the 
same way that other, similarly situated litigants have been 
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treated in the past, is commanded to keep quiet instead. No 
degree of expediency, or administrative convenience, or 
supposed "unfairness", can outweigh the preceding 
consideration. 
Second, the discussions ·of the majority completely 
ignore the Constitutional aspects of the problem, of which 
there are two: 
1. Equal protection and due process 
problems inherent in non-citation 
would appear obvious. 
2. In addition, First Amendment problems 
are involved. Aside from possible 
freedom of speech aspects, we refer 
to the provisions of the First 
Amendment which guarantee the right 
to petition the government for redress 
of grievances. If the grievance on 
which relief is sought is a petitioner's 
claim that the law is not being 
uniformly applied in the courts, because 
there is a lack of even-handedness in 
the treatment of himself and other 
classes of litigants, he is deprived of 
an effective opportunity to do so. 
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In connection with the latter point, it was 
disturbing to hear some of the testimony presented to the 
Committee that there seems to be a claimed pattern of 
unevenness in the publication of opinions in criminal 
prosecutions involving sex related activities. We are not 
able, nor do we seek to verify or dispute the accuracy of 
such charges. Our point is that, as long as such charges 
are made, there ought to be a ready means of verifying their 
merits or lack thereof in cases where they are made and in 
which a litigant feels aggrieved. 
Permitting parties making such charges to cite 
pertinent unpublished opinions, would seem to be an 
appropriate way of dispelling the doubts otherwise cast on 
the administration of justice. 
The majority, of course, recognizes some of these 
problems implicitly, because it recommends an exception to 
the non-citability rule to permit citation of unpublished 
opinions in support of petitions for hearing in the Supreme 
Court. This exception provides relief to aggrieved litigants 
only before the one Court that is not required to listen to 
them; i.e., before the Supreme Court, which has full 
discretion to deny hearing. Meanwhile, opportunity to make 
the same argument, and correct the same flaw in the law 
before the courts that must hear any aggrieved litigant, and 
presumably must resolve the issue presented by him (in the 
case of the Court of Appeal, "in writing with reasons stated"), 
is simply denied. 
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Finally, we commend to the majority its own 
exhortation of the benefits to be derived from access to the 
body of unpublished decisional law. If judges, lawyers, and 
scholars are to have access to this material, and this access 
is to be the source of the benefits so highly thought of by 
the majority, then we are at a loss to understand why this 
same benefit should not be available to the courts and the 
litigants when they most need it: in the midst of litigation 
that gives rise to an issue precisely the same as that 
decided in other [unpublished] cases. 
Therefore, we would recommend repeal of Rule 977 
and (1) substitution of a rule requiring adequate advance 
notice of an intent to rely upon an unpublished opinion, 
together wi~h supplying of a copy thereof to all affected; 
and (2) a request to the State Bar that it recommend to the 
Supreme Court a Rule of Professional Conduct articulating 
the duty of attorneys aware of unfavorable (or potentially 
unfavorable) unpublished opinions to disclose such cases to 
the tribunal, along with the favorable ones. 
Only in this way will there be an effective 
mechanism for the correction of unintentional lapses or 
intentional abuses of the non-publication process. 
DATED: May 15, 1979 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
EDWARD L. LASCHER 
GIDEON KANNER 
MICHAEL M. BERGER 
Chief Justice's Advisory Committee 
For an Effective Publication Rule 
1'finority Report 
In Oppo.sJtion to the Advisory Committee's 
Recommendation Relative to Subdivision (d) 
of rule 976 of the California Rules of 
Court. 
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Minority Report 
Relative to Proposed Subdivision (d) of Rule 976 
The Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication 
Rule recommends the addition of subdivision (d) to rule 976 
of the California Rules of Court to provide that: "(d) [St:!pel!-
seeee opinions Effect of grant of hearing] Rega~s~ess ef eae 
£ere~e~ng pre~i~ions o£ e~is ra±e; no opinion St:!pe~seeee 6y 
ehe g~aneing o£ a aearing; ~ehea~ing e~ eeae~ jt:!sieia~ aeeien 
sfia~l ee pt:!slis~ee in e~e Sffieia± Reperes~ Published Court 
of Appeal opinions in cases in which the Supreme Court grants 
a hearing shall remain published in the Official Reports, and 
a notation of grant of hearing shall immediately follow such 
opinions." 
It is felt that the foregoing proposed subdivision 
calling for the retention of Court of Appeal opinions in the 
Official Reports following the granting of hearingsis incon-
sistent with the judicially declared status of such opinions 
as nonentities and is otherwise counterproductive as hereafter 
noted. The subdivision therefore ought not to be adopted. 
Background and Reasoning: 
By 1903 the judicial business of California had grown 
to such a degree that the Supreme Court no longer could handle 
the load. Accordingly, in 1904 the Constitution was amended 
to provide for District Courts of Appeal and for Supreme Court 
review of the new district courts' decisions. (Then Cal. Const., 
Ail:\ 
art.VI, § 4.) The applicable clause provided: "The supreme 
' 
court shall have power m order any cause pending before the 
supreme court to be heard and determined by a district court 
of appeal, and to order any cause pending before a district 
court of appeal to be heard and determined by the supreme 
court. The order last mentioned may be made before judgment 
has been pronounced by a district court of appeal, or within 
thirty days after such judgment shall have become final there-
in. The judgments of district courts of appeal shall become 
final upon expiration of thirty days after the same shall have 
been pronounced." 
The purpose of granting the Supreme Court the power 
of transfer after decision in the district courts (now Courts 
of Appeal) was "'to secure harmony and uniformity in the de-
cisions, their conformity to the settled rules and principles 
of law, a uniform decision throughout the state, a correct and 
uniform construction of the constitution, statutes and charters, 
and, in some instances, a final decision by the court of last 
resort of some doubtful or disputed question of law.'" (In re 
Wells (1917) 174 Cal. 467, 472.) 
By virtue of the foregoing constitutional provision 
substantively carried forward to present article VI, section 
12, the Supreme Court was given power· to vacate a district 
court decision and order the cause transferred to its own cal-
endar for argument and fresh decision. (In re Wells, supra, 
at pp. 472-473.) Over the years the Supreme Court has con-
sistently spelled out the effect of such a transfer. Witkin 
summarizes the court's position to be: "The case is then 
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'at large,' i.e., to be decided on the entire record and all 
the issues, as if originally appealed to the Supreme Court, 
regardless of the ground relied upon in granting the hearing." 
(6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1971 ed.) Appeal, § 617, p. 4540.) 
In Knouse v. Nimocks (1937) 8 Cal.2d- 482, 483, the Supreme 
Court held: "The opinion and decision e • * by our order of 
transfer, have become a nullity and are of no force or effect 
either as a judgment or as an authoritative statement of any 
principle of law therein discussed." A more recent affirma-
tion of this holding appears in Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries, 
.!!!.£. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 535, 541, footnote 1: "Although plain-
tiffs did not raise the issue of negligent equipage in their 
petition for hearing, the question was briefed by both parties 
and may be reviewed by this court. An order granting a peti-
tion for hearing transfers the entire cause here [citations], 
and the case is then to be decided on all issues, as if origin-
ally appealed to this court, regardless of the grounds relied 
on in the petition. [Citations omitted.]" 
Given the foregoing background and the repeated 
rulings of the Supreme Court that the cause is at large in all 
respects upon transfer, it becomes clear that the significance 
of the lower court's decision is reduced to the point that it 
is unworthy of publication in the Official Reports. To publish 
the opinion under these circumstances is to encourage pure 
"speculation" as to the reason or reasons why the Supreme Court 
granted the hearing. The Supreme Court may reach issues not 
even raised in the petition for hearing. (Menchaca v. Helms 
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Bakeries, Inc., supra, 68 Cal.2d 535, 541.) The Supreme Court may 
adopt the decision of the Court of Appeal verbatim, reverse it 
partially or in whole, or affirm it on radically different theo-
ries. To encourage speculation by publishing such superseded de-
cisions is counterproductive and opposed to the Supreme Court's 
clear holding relative to the judicial worth of such decisions. 
Until the court retreats from its holding on the subject, publi-
cation appears to be inappropriate. In £act, prriceeding with 
the publication of such decisions automatically violates the 
standards of publication that the committee recommends should 
control publication and guaranties the publication of the un-
worthy opinion. 
Add~.tionally, to continue such opinions in the Official 
Reports will require subscribers to pay for many pages of deci-
sions that possess no vitality either now or for· the future. 
· In view of the foregoing background and considerations 
it is respectfully suggested that the corrilldttee's recommenda-
tion relative to the adoption of subdivision (d) of new proposed 
rule 976 not be followed. 
DATED: May 15, 1979 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT E. FORHICHI 
ELLIS J. HORVITZ 
LEONARD SACKS 
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APPENDIX A 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 
Rule 976. Publication of appellate opinions 
(a) * * * 
(b) [Standards for opinions of other courts] No An 
opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department 
of the superior court shall be published in the Official 
Reports ~ft~e~~ if such opinion: {1) establishes a new rule 
of _laws applies an established rule or prinaiple to a faatual 
situation substantially different from that in published aasess 
or alters or modifies an existing rule,± (2) involves a legal 
issue of continuing public interest~ to a substantial group of 
the publia suah as publia offiaerss agenaies or entities, mem-
bers of an eaonomia alass, or a business 
groz:,ps or (3) criticizes existing law,, 3 
creates an apparent aonfliat in the laws 
or professional 
(4) resolves or 
(5) is a partial or 
complete dissenting opinion, oP a aonaurring opinion in 
whiah ~easons are stated, or is aaaompanied by suah an 
opinion, (6) aonstitutes a reversal of an administrative 
~f ~his er~eerien ea±~~ fer ~~e±ieaeien e£ the relatively 
- £ew e~iniens that e~tab±i~h new rtlies e£ law, ine±tld~n~ 
a new eenstrtletion o£ a stat~te, or that ehan~e existin~ 
r~±es. ~his eriterien does net ;~sti£y ~ttb±ieat~en o£ a 
£aet ease e£ £irst im~ressien, where a ±e~a± ra±e er 
~rineip±e is applied to a sabstantia±±y new £aetaa± 
sitttatien. 
~f ~his eriterien re~~ires that the ±e~a± isstle7 rather than 
- the ease or eentreversy, be e£ p~b±ie interest and that 
the interest be e£ a eentinain~ natare and net merely 
transitory. Pttb~ie interest mast be distin~aished £rem 
~ttb~ie etiriosity. ~he re~tiirement e£ ~tlb±ie interest may 
be satis£ied i£ the ie~a± issae is o£ eentinaing interest 
to a Stibstantia~ ~rotlp o£ the ~ah~ie saeh as ~ab~ie e£-
£ieers, a~eneies or entities, members e£ an eeenemie e~ass7 
er a basiness or ~re£essiena~ ~roti~• An e~inion whieh 
e±ari£ies a eontro~iin9 rti~e o£ ~aw that is net we±± es-
eab~ished or e±ear~y statea in p~ier ~e~erted o~iniens, 
whieh reeonei~es een£~ieting ~ines o£ a~therity, or whieh 
tests the ~resent va~ioity e£ a sett~ed prineipie in the 
!i9ht o£ modern atttherities e~sewhere may be ~~b±ished an-
der this eriterien i£ it satisfies the re~airement that 
the ~e~a! iesae ~e o£ eentinain~ ~ttb~ie interest. 
3f ~his eriterion wea~d ;asti£y ~tlb~ieatien e£ the rare inter-
- mediate a~~e!!ate opinion whieh £inds £ati~t with existin~ 
eommen ~aw er statntory ~rinei~~es and deetrines and whieh 
reeommends ehan~es ~y a hi~her eeart or ~y the be~is~at~re~ 
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agency decision based on a rule of law or interpretation of 
administrative rules, (7) constitutes a significant and 
nondupliaative contribution to legal literature either by a 
historical review of the law or by describing the legisla-
tive history of a statute or ordinance, or (8) otherwise 
aids the administration of justice. 
(c) [Publication procedure] 
(1) [Courts of Appeal and appellate departments] 
Bft~ess etherw~se di~eeted by the Stl~reme 6etl~t, a An opinion 
of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department of the 
superior court shall be published in the Official Reports if 
a majority of the court rendering the opinion certifies, 
prior to the decision becoming final in that court, that it 
meets one or more of the standards specified in subdivision 
(b). An e~~n~en net so ee~t~£~ed sha%± neve~the±ess 
he ~tlh±~shed ~n the e££~e~a± Re~orts tl~on o~der o£ the 
Stt~reme eott~t te that e££eet. 
(2) [Supreme Court] Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an 
opinion certified for publication shall not be published in 
the Official Reports, and an opinion not so certified shall 
be published in the Official Reports, upon an order of the 
Supreme Court to such effect. In exercising its power to 
order opinions published or not published, the Supreme Court 
shall observe the standards for publication specified in 
subdivision (b) of this rule. 
(d) [Stt~erseded o~~n~ens Effect of grant of hearing] 
Regardless o£ the foregoing ~rov~siens e£ this rtt±e, 
no e~in~en stt~erseded by the grant~n9 o£ a fiear~n97 rehear~ng 
er ether jttd~eia± aet~en sha±± be ~ttb%~shee in the 8££~-
e~a± Re~erts. Published Court of Appeal opinions in oases 
in which the Supreme Court grants a hearing shall remain 
published in the Official Reports, and a notation of grant 
of hearing shall immediately follow suah opinions. 
(e) * * * 
so 
Rule 977. Citation of unpublished opinions prohibited; 
exceptions 
(a) [General. ruZ.e] An opinion e£ a ee~rt: e£ A~~ea:l: 
er e£ aft a~~e:l:lat:e ae~aremeftt: e£ a ~~~erier ee~rt tnat 
is not published, certified for pubZ.ication, or ordered pub-
:t 
Z.ished in the Official Reports pursuant to ruZ.e 976 shall 
not be cited by a court or by a party in any other action or 
proceeding except wneft t:ne e~~n~eft ~s re:l:evaftt ~naer 
t:ne deeer~ftes e£ ene law e£ ene ease7 res ;~eieaea er 
eel:l:aeeral est:e~~el; er ~n a er~m~al aee~en er ~reeeed~ft~ 
~ftvelv~ft~ ene same de£endafte er a d~se~~liftar~ aee~eft 
er ~reeeea~n~ ~nvelvin~ ene same res~eftaeftt as provided in 
subdivision (b) of this ruZe. 
(b) [Ezceptions] An opinion noz published, certified 
for publication, or.> ordered pubZ.ished in -the QfficiaZ Reports 
may be ci-ted in another actio~ ~n the following situations: 
(1) In connection with a pe-tition for hearing proceed-
ing before the Supreme Court whenever it appears -that an un-
pubZ.ished opinion of a Court af Appeal conflicts with -the 
decision or order in which a hearing is sought. 
(2) When the opinion of an appelZ.ate department of the 
superior court is reZ.evant to an ac-tion or proceeding before 
that appeZZ.ate department, or before a municipal. or justice 
court within the same county; 
(3) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines 
of the Zaw of the case, res judicata, or coZ.ZateraZ estoppel.; 
(4) When the opinion is reZ.evant to a criminal. action 
or disciplinary proceeding involving the same party or a 
member of the State Bar. 
(c) [Citation procedure] A copy of any opinion citabZ.e 
under the exceptions specified in subdivision (b) of this 
rule shaZZ be furnished to the court and aZZ. parties by at-
taching it to the document in which citation is made, or, if 
the citation is to be made oraZZy, i;hen within a reasonabZ.e 
time in advance of citation. 
* ~n~e r~ie ena±i nee appiy ee an ep~n*en eerei£~ed £er p~bli­
eae~en pr~er ee ~ee aeettai p~bi~eae~en~ 
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Rule 978c Requesting publication of unpublished opinions 
{a) [Request procedure; action by court rendering 
opinion] A request by any person for publication in the 
Official Reports of an opinion not certified for publication 
may be made only to the court that rendered the opinion. 
The request shall be made promptly by letter, with a copy to 
each party to the action or proceeding not joining therein, 
stating concisely why the opinion meets one or more of the 
criteria for publication in rule 976. If the court does 
not, or by reason of the decision's finality as to that 
court cannot, grant the request, the court may, and at the 
instance of the person requesting publication shall, transmit 
the request and a copy of the opinion to the Supreme Court 
with its recommendation for appropriate disposition and a 
brief statement of its reasons therefor. The transmitting 
court shaZl also send a copy of itP recommendation and 
statement of Peasons to each par~y to the action or pro-
ceeding and to any other person ~ho has requested pubZication. 
{b) [Action by Supreme Court] When a request for 
publication is received by the Supreme Court £rem ~fte 
ee~r~ ~ftat reftaerea tfte e~ift~eft pursuant to subdivision (a) 
of this ruZe the Supreme Court shall either order the opin-
ion published or deny the request. Such requests shall be 
acted upon promptly~ and each party to the action or pro-
ceeding and any person who has requested publication shall 
be notified of the action taken by the Court. 
{c) * * * 
Rule 29. Grounds for hearing in Supreme Court; comment 
on denial of hearing 
(a) - (b) * * * 
(c) [Comment on denial of hearing] Upon denial of 
hearing in a Court of Appeal case in which the opinion is 
published the Supreme Court may expressly withhoZd its 
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approval of or otherwise aomment on the whole or any part of 
a Court of Appeal opinion~ provided that the failure of the 
Supreme Court to do so shall not be deemed an approval 
thereof. Suah expressions and aomments shall be published 
in the Offiaial Reports~ and shall appear immediately fol-
lowing the Court of Appeal opinion to whiah they are addressed. 
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APPENDIX B 
STORAGE/RETRIEVAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Two legal publishers and a computerized legal re-
search service made presentations to the committee concern-
ing storage/retrieval technologies now available for legal 
materials$ At least two major types of storage/retrieval 
equipment are currently available--miniaturizing technologies 
like microfilm/microfiche and computer memory systems. The 
former system is used for storage of full text federal tax 
letter rulings in the ~ Letter Rulings Reporter published 
by Commerce Clearing House, Inc., of Chicago. In this sys-
tem, subscribers receive weekly mailings in full-size print; 
these include the full-text rulings and topical indexes and 
citators. When his binder is full, the subscriber may replace 
the full-size text of the rulings with "microfiche" or "ultra-
fiche" copies. This reduces storage volume to 1/42 (microfiche) 
[42X] or 1/75 (ultrafiche) [75X] of the originals. Indexes and 
citators are retained in full-size format for ease of access. 1 / 
A representative of NILS Publishing Company made a 
presentation comparing different microform formats. In his 
opinion, 75X is not standard and is hard to read. He favors 
48X, or even 24X. Assuming about 56,000 pages of unpublished 
.. opinions a year, one year's output could be stored on 56 7:SX 
fiches (1,000 pages per fiche), or 134 48X fiches (420 pages 
per fiche). 
Viewers for microfiche are estimated to cost around 
$200-$300, and viewer/printers capable to producing full-sized 
1/ At the committee's request, CCH prepared a rough estimate 
- of the cost of such a subscription to unpublished Califor-
nia Court of Appeal opinions. Assuming 1,000 subscribers, 
a full-sized topical index and citators, and full-sized 
opinion text running to 56,000 pages/year iBsued biweekly 
and replaced periodically by microfiche or ultrafiche, 
a subscription would cost roughly $400 annually. With 
microfiche opinion text only, the subscription would cost 
about $200. Each year's output would fill about 50 fiches 
at 75X. 
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copy of a microform document cost between $1,500 and $3,000. 2/ 
Computer data storage and retrieval is exemplified 
by the LEXIS Service of Mead Data Central, two of whose rep-
resentatives made a presentation to the committee. This 
system uses no index/lexicon. Rather, the user chases any 
word, phrase,or group of words, and the computer identifies 
all opinions containing the word(s)/phrase and for each pre-
sents to the user a block of text surrounding any such use 
{including a number of words before and after the target words) • 
The user can also get the computer to print out the entire text 
f . . 3/ o any op~n~on.-
The committee's tentative impression is that the 
microform technology is more promising than computers for 
handling unpublished opinions. Microform appears cheaper to 
both government and userse It can al~o reproduce the actual 
text of unpublished opinions, thereby giving a guarantee of 
authenticity that is not available in a computer printout. 
(Theproblem of authentic copies may be serious in the unpub-
lished opinion field, for there is no official report to turn 
to for easy confirmation.) 
Nevertheless, in the committee's judgment there is 
much uncertainty, and nore_thorough study of these matters 
is 
2/ 
y 
reguired. 
In the opinion of the NILS Publishing representative, a 
service with full-text opinions and indexes, with the 
opinions replaceable after one year with microfiche, would 
cost roughly $1,250 per year on a subscriber base of 6,000. 
The Mead representatives estimated that the unpublished 
output of the California Courts of Appeal could be keyed 
and loaded into the LEXIS memory for about $200,000 per 
year, assuming 60,000 pages per year and stored as a 
nprivate library" for about $20,000 'a year. Each user 
would presumably rent a terminal, and there would be charges 
for this and for use to search and retrieve opinions. 
(There is one public LEXIS ter~minaL in Kansas, which charges 
up to $50 per use.) 
The NILS Publishing representative predicted that micro-
computers with tape and an index system will soon be avail-
able and be far less costly to the user than on-line sys-
tems like LEXIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. Authorities that Generally Favor One or More Aspects 
of Selective Publication 
American Bar Association Commission on Standards of 
Judicial Administration (1977) Standards Relating 
to Appellate Courts (see pp. 62-65) [state and 
federal courts] [opposes noncitation] 
California State Bar, Conference Committee Report 
~ 1974 Conference Resolution No. 11-18 (1976) 51 
State Bar J. 400 [Cal. state courts] [con-
tains some criticismsJ 
California State Bar (1973) Supplemental Report of 
the Special Committee on Appellate Courts: The-
Citat~on of Unpublishea-opinions [Cal. state~urts] 
California State Bar (1972) Report of the Special 
Committee on Appellate Courts: The Citation of 
Unpublishea-opinions [Cal. state~urts] 
Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of 
Opinions ~ the-pe&eral and State Appellate Courts 
(1974) 67 Law Lib. J. 362 [state and federal courts] 
Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate 
Court Opinions (1973) Report [in support of rule 
977] [Cal. state courts] 
Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate 
Court Opinions (1971) Report [in support of amend-
ments to rule 976] [Cal. state courts] 
Frank, Remarks before the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Conference (1977) 16 The Judges' Journal 10 
[federal courts] 
Gardner, The Perils of Publication (1977) 4 Orange 
County Bar J. 7 [Cal. state courts] 
Gustafson, Some Observations about California 
Courts of-xppeal (1971) 19 u.c.L.A. L.Rev. 167 (see 
pp. 204-207) [Cal. state courts] 
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Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions 
(1972) 56 Judicature 195 [state and federal courts] 
Leavitt, The Yearly Two-Foot Shelf (1973) 4 Pacific 
L.J. 1 (see pp. 22-26) [cal. state courts] 
R. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions (ed. 1974) 
(see p. 309) {state and federal courts] 
Leflar, The Washington Court of Appeals, 32 Wash. 
St. B. News (Nov. 1978) pp.-r0-21 [Wash. state 
courts] 
Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork 
and Managed Flexibility (1976) 23 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 
m (see pp. 436-439) [federal courts] 
Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in 
California (1972) ~Hast.:L.J. 39 [Cal~ state courts] 
Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One 
Court~Exper~ence (1978) 32 Ar~L.Rev. 26 [Ark. 
state courts] 
B. Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) 
(sec pp. 23-38) TCal. state courts] [includes 
criticism of standards] 
II. Authorities that Generally Oppose One or More Aspects 
of Selective Publication 
P. Carrington, D. Meader, M. Rosenberg, Justice on 
Appeal (1976) (see pp. 35-41) [state and federai 
courts] 
Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh 
CircuitTs Non-PUbliCatron-Rule-rl9/7f 39~P~tt.L.Rev. 
608 [federal courts] ----
Comment, Publish or Perish: The Destiny of Appellate 
Opinions ~n Californ~a (197~13 Santa Clara Law-
yer 756 [Cal. state courts] 
Do Unpublished Decisions Hamper Justice? (1978) 64 
A.B.A.J. 318 {state and federal courts] 
Coleman, To Publish or not to Publish--That is the 
Questiofi; Sexual Law Reporter, March/Apr~l-r9~ 
[Cal. state courts] 
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Gardner, The Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: 
Denial of Equal Justice? (1975) 61 A.B.A.Jo 1224 
[federal courts] 
Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Proposal for a 
Chanc;re ~n the "Packag~ng" of Cal~forn~a CoUrt of 
Appeal opiniOns to Provid~ More Useful Information 
for the Consumer (1979) 19 Santa Clara Lawyer 53 
[Cal:-8tate courts] · 
Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the 
Publication of Appellate Court-opin~ons (19isr--
27 Stanford E7Rev. 791 [state and federal courts] 
Kanner, The Unpublished Opinion: Friend ~ Foe? 
(1973) 48 State Bar J. 386 [Cal. state courts] 
Lascher, Lascher at Large (1975) 50 State Bar J. 
36 [Cal. state courts] 
Newbern and Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the 
Disappearing Court (1978) 32 Ark.L.Rev. 37 [Ark. 
state courts] 
Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The 
Need for Articulated-yudicial Reasoning and certain 
PreCedent in Cal~fornia Law (1977) 50 So.Cal.L.Rev. 
1181 [Cal.-state courts]---
Note, Selective Publication of Case Law (1966) 39 
So.Cal.L.Rev. 608 [Cal. state-courts] 
Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts 
of Appeals {1977) 63 Cornel1~Rev. 128 [federal 
courts] 
Reynolds and Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent 
--Limited Publication-and Non-C~tat~on Rules ~n the 
Un~ted States Courtsof-xppeals (1978) 78 Colum.L:Rev. 
1167 [federal courts] 
Rubin, Views from the Lower Court (1976) 23 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 448 (see pp. 451-453) [Cal. state courts] 
Silverman, The Unwritten Law: The Unpublished Opinion 
in California (1976) 51 state Bar J. 33 
TCal. state courts] 
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Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions (1978) 64 
A.B.A.J. 1245 [federal courts] 
Thompson, Mitigating the Dama2e: One Judge and No 
Judge Opinions (197-s-r-50 State Bar J. 476 
(see p. 480) [Cal. state courts] 
Weisgall, StoE, Search and Seize: The Emerging 
Doctrine of Unfounded Susf~c~on (1974) 9 U.S.F.L.Rev. 
219 (see pp. -253-254) [Ca • state courts] 
Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of 
Stare Decisis (1978) 61 Marquette L.Rev. 581 
[Wiscons~n state courts] 
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APPENDIX D 
ORGANIZATIONS AND BUSINESSES CONTACTED 
The committee invited the following groups 
and concerns to present their views concerning selective 
publication: 
Judges, Judicial Personnel, Judicial Administration Centers 
Selected Presiding Justices and Administrative 
Presiding Justices of the California Courts 
of Appeal 
California Judges Association 
Selected Superior Court Judges 
Judicial Attorneys of California 
Selected Clerks of Courts of Appeal 
Municipal Clerks Association 
Trial Court Administrators Association 
Selected judicial administration centers 
Executive and Legislative Bodies 
Governor's Legal Affairs Office 
Selected Legislative Committees 
Department of Consumer Affairs 
County Supervisors Association · 
Los Angeles Consumer Affairs Department 
Office of Criminal Justice Planning 
Lawyers, Public Interest Firms, Bar Associations 
California State Bar Section Chairpersons, and selected 
Committee Chairpersons 
Legal aid, legal assistance and legal services 
offices throughout California 
Presidents of county bar associations, specialized bars, 
and geographical bar associations 
California Academy of Appellate Lawyers 
California Trial Lawyers Association 
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Publishers, Research Services, Data Processing Concerns, 
Computer Companies, Microfilm Services, Etc. 
A. B. Dick Company 
Ampex Memory Products Division 
Attorneys Printing Supply 
BDS Computer Corporation 
Braegen Corporation 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 
C.E.S. Corporation 
The Cambridge Systems Group 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
Continuing Education of the Bar 
Datagraphix 
Devoke Company 
George Lithograph Company 
Hewlett Packard 
Infor;..latics, Inc. 
Information Access Corporation 
Information Handling Services 
International Data Corporation 
Jurisearch, Inc. 
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
Memo rex 
NILS Publishing Company 
Parker & Sons Publication, Inc. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
The Service Bureau Company 
Sperry-Univac Mini-Computer Operations 
3M Company 
University Microfilm, Inc. 
Varian Graphics 
Wang Laboratories, Inc. 
West Publishing Company 
WSI Micrographics 
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Prosecutors and Defenders 
Attorney General 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
State Public Defender 
California Public Defenders Association 
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
California District Attorneys Association 
Law Schools and Law Libraries 
Law schools throughout California 
Selected law school libraries 
State Law Library 
Selected county law libraries 
American Association of Law Librarians 
Legal and General Press 
Legal newspapers throughout California 
California and major national dailies and 
periodicals 
Judicial administration publications 
Citizen Groups 
California Labor Federation 
League of Women Voters 
Consumer Federation of California 
League of California Cities 
California Citizens Action Group 
California Taxpayers Association 
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APPENDIX E 
MEMBERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION RULE 
The parenthetical entries indicate members' prior 
public involvement, if any, in the specific subject of 
selective publication. 
Hon. Thomas W. Caldecott, Co-Chairperson 
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appel-
late District, Division Four {member of Committee on Se-
~ective Publication of Appellate Court Opinions created in 
1970 by Chief Justice Wright). 
Mr. Sheldon Portman, Co-Chairperson 
Public Defender, Santa Clara County (member of 
State Bar Publication Review Committee and proponent of 
Santa Clara County Bar Association recommendations ~ publi-
cation of criminal cases, Supreme Court decertification). 
Hon. Robert Gardner 
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appel-
late District, Division Two (author of The Perils of Publi-
cation (1977) 4 Orange County Bar J. 7). 
Hon. Bernard s. Jefferson 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appel-
late District, Division Four (author of separate opinion in 
People v. Valenzuela (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 427, 433, dealing 
with validity and wisdom of rule 977 as applied to unpub-
lished opinions of the Appellate Department of the Los 
Angeles Superior Court). 
Hon. Vaino H. Spencer 
Judge of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County. 
Hon. Homer B. Thompson 
Judge of the Superior Court, Santa Clara County. 
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Mr. Michael M. Berger 
Attorney at Law, Santa Monica. 
Rev. William G. Cunningham 
Past Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara. 
Ms. Gloria deHart 
Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco. 
Mr. Robert Formichi 
Reporter of Decisions, San Francisco. (One of staff 
to Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate Court 
Opinions created in 1970 by Chief Justice Wright.) 
Mr. Joseph Freitas, Jr. 
District Attorney, City and County of San Francisco. 
Mr. Ellis J. Horvitz 
Attorney at Law, Encino (member of State Bar Spe-
cial Commit~ee on Appellate Courts that prepared Supple-
mental Report (1973) Citation of Unpublished Opinions) • 
Mr. Myron Jacobstein 
Law Librarian, Stanford University (author of Some 
Reflections on the Control of Publication of Appellate Court 
Opinions (1975) 27 Stanford L.Rev. 791). 
Mr. Gideon Kanner 
Professor, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School (au-
thor of The Unpublished Opinion: Friend or Foe? (1973) 48 
State Bar J. 386; Chairperson of State Bar Publication Review 
Committee) 
Mr. Edward L. Lascher 
Attorney at Law, Ventura; former State Bar Vice 
President (author of comments on selective publication in 
column Lascher at Large, e.g., (1975) 50 State Bar J. 36. 
Mr. Roderick Rose 
Chairman of the Board, Bancroft-Whitney Company 
(publisher of official reports; provided estimates of number 
of volumes needed to publish all Court of Appeal opinions). 
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Mr. Leonard Sacks 
Attorney at Law, Encino (member of State Bar 
Publication Review Committee) 
Mr. Charles M. Sevilla 
Chief Assistant State Public Defender, Los Angeles. 
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